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This is the exact shape of the report you receive for your repository.
It was generated from tests/sample_vuln.py, an intentionally-vulnerable fixture
shipped with the scanner — not a real client repo. Sample is based on public code (the project's own test fixture), already sanitized; no client data is shown.
Target: tests/sample_vuln.py (fixture)
Engine: mcp-audit v1 (pure stdlib, MIT)
Scan date: 2026-09-18
| Severity | Count |
|---|---|
| CRITICAL | 3 |
| HIGH | 4 |
| MEDIUM | 0 |
| LOW | 1 |
| Total | 8 |
1. call:os.system — shell 命令执行
tests/sample_vuln.py:10os.system(...). Any input that reaches this call becomes a shell command.2. shell_injection — subprocess shell=True
tests/sample_vuln.py:12subprocess invoked with shell=True is a command-injection surface: unquoted user input is interpreted by the shell.3. call:eval — 动态代码执行
tests/sample_vuln.py:14eval() executes arbitrary code from its argument. If that argument can be influenced by input, the tool is remote-code-executable.4. import:subprocess — 导入 subprocess
tests/sample_vuln.py:4subprocess, which can execute shell commands (see CRITICAL #1/#2).5. call:subprocess.run — 子进程调用
tests/sample_vuln.py:12shell=True is set (see CRITICAL #2).6. secret_env — 读取敏感环境变量 AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY
tests/sample_vuln.py:20AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY from the environment. A malicious tool can exfiltrate cloud credentials.7. secret_env — 读取敏感环境变量 PRIVATE_KEY
tests/sample_vuln.py:21PRIVATE_KEY from the environment. A malicious tool can exfiltrate wallet/signing keys.8. import:os — 导入 os
tests/sample_vuln.py:3os; os.system/os.popen carry shell risk (see CRITICAL #1).os.system) — if any tool parameter (e.g. a filename, a URL, a query string) is concatenated into the os.system string, a malicious MCP client can inject ; curl ... | sh and run arbitrary commands on the host running the server.eval) — if eval() receives any remotely-influenced string, the server is effectively arbitrary-code-executable. This is the single highest-severity pattern an MCP server can contain.secret_env) — any tool that reads AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY / PRIVATE_KEY from the environment can forward those values to an attacker-controlled endpoint. Even a "read-only" tool description can hide this.*Static analysis flags patterns, not proven exploits. Each finding above needs a manual read to confirm whether untrusted input can actually reach the sink — manual review of individual findings is available on request, quoted per engagement (reply to the delivery email with the order id).*